Abstract

It is estimated that the level of opium poppy cultivation in the province of Badakhshan has increased three fold since 2000. This, combined with the visible displays of conspicuous consumption in and around towns such as Faizabad, Baharak and Jurm has prompted some commentators to raise concerns over the entrenchment of the opium economy within the province. The most commonly cited explanation for the dramatic expansion in opium poppy cultivation is the increase in the farmgate price of opium in Badakhshan, increasing by some 700% from 2000 to 2002. However, this explanation does not capture the changing socio-economic and political environment within the province since the end of the war nor the complexity of rural livelihoods within the area. It also assumes a degree of price responsiveness amongst drug crop producing households that is rarely practicable given the delicate balance between the different elements in their rural livelihood strategies.

This Study explores the reasons for the expansion in opium poppy cultivation within Badakhshan over the last 3 years. It suggests that the combined effect of the drought, the shift in the regional market for opium, and the end of the civil war has created the conditions by which opium poppy could expand. In particular, the Study documents the unequal distribution of income generated from opium poppy. It illustrates how those households that were worst hit by the drought have used opium poppy cultivation as a coping strategy, using the income they gained from its cultivation to purchase the basic commodities they sold to survive the rigours of the drought. It documents how, despite unprecedented high prices for opium, this resource-poor group has only succeeded in repurchasing the household commodities they sold during the drought but have systematically failed to regain their long-term productive assets. It highlights how the sale of livestock (a traditional source of credit) and the mortgaging (and sale) of land, continues to leave this group dependent on opium poppy as a means of survival.

In stark contrast the Study illustrates how those households with good quality land, low levels of household debt, sufficient livestock, and sources of non-farm and off-farm income not only escaped the rigours of the drought but have benefited disproportionately from opium cultivation. Their increasing control over land and access to credit is consolidating high levels of opium poppy cultivation within the province, despite reductions in the farmgate price. Indeed, the Study concludes that whilst the factors that have stimulated the rapid increases in opium poppy cultivation over the last few years have largely run out of steam, the longer term impact of the drought and the Taliban ban on opium have conspired against a fall in opium poppy cultivation in the coming years. Instead, it is anticipated that cultivation will not grow at such a dramatic rate.

Perhaps of particular concern for the future is the fact that Badakhshan is more akin to the areas of illicit drug crop production that we have become used to in South East and South Asia, as well as in Latin America. Typically these areas are characterised by their isolation from the state and its functions, their proximity to international borders, difficult terrain, and poor physical and social infrastructure. Minority groups that are in political, economic, and sometimes military, conflict with the central authorities often inhabit these areas. Within this context, and assuming progress in reducing opium poppy cultivation in the more accessible areas of Afghanistan where opium is currently concentrated, those commentators that refer to the entrenchment of the narco-economy in Badakhshan may well be proved right.