Abstract

The 2003/04 growing season saw an unprecedented increase in opium poppy cultivation in Afghanistan. The United Nations Office for Drugs and Crime (UNODC) reported that cultivation increased from 80,000 hectares to 131,000 hectares, a 64% increase in cultivation in one year. However, this aggregate figure masks a more complex picture in which cultivation is found to vary by province, district, village and even household, despite the relative profitability of the crop. Indeed, cultivation can be found to be increasing in one district or village whilst falling in the neighbouring area. In a village where opium poppy is grown intensively there may well be a number of households that do not cultivate it at all. Also as we have seen this year, despite significant reductions in farmgate prices, aggregate levels of cultivation may increase dramatically. There is no single cause – opium poppy cultivation is a function of where, who and when – and therefore highly dependent on local factors.

This Study explores the different drivers that have influenced households in their decision to cultivate opium poppy in the 2004/05 growing season. It is the result of 247 interviews conducted in 16 districts in five provinces of Afghanistan. It builds on fieldwork undertaken during both the 2002/03 and 2003/04 growing seasons and draws on the growing body of indepth research that has been undertaken on the role of opium poppy in rural livelihoods in Afghanistan.

The Study reports that for the first time in three years there appears to have been a significant downturn in the number of households cultivating opium poppy and the amount of land they intend to allocate to the crop. It suggests that whilst falling farm gate prices, low yields and concerns over food security have played an important role, the primary reason for lower levels of planting is the belief that the government is more serious this year in its intent to reduce opium poppy cultivation. In particular, it suggests that there is a growing view that the central government has greater jurisdiction over provincial and local authorities and consequently regional powerbrokers are more likely to comply with the President’s desire to see a reduction in opium poppy cultivation this year. However, the Study suggests that the perception of the risks associated with cultivating opium poppy vary both between and within provinces. Moreover, the duration of the ban remains unclear in the minds of respondents. The Study suggests that most respondents in areas in which opium poppy is concentrated consider their compliance with the ban conditional and time bound.

The Study suggests that the impact of eradication on household decision making is contingent and contextual. It documents how a number of households that have experienced eradication prior to the 2003/04 growing season, some of them over two consecutive years, cultivated opium poppy last year, typically cultivating a larger area than those whose crop had not been destroyed previously. On the other hand it appears that eradication in Wardak in the 2003/04 growing season was effective in reducing opium poppy cultivation this year. However, agricultural diversification, including the extensive cultivation of high value fruit and vegetable crops with access to the high value market of Kabul, and the limited history of opium poppy cultivation in the area, may well have made the transition from illicit to licit livelihood strategies less problematic than might be the case in other areas.

The concerted effort to reduce the level of cultivation in Nangarhar this year is also documented by the Study. It suggests that this approach has learned much from the Taliban ban in 2001, as well as previous attempts in the province to reduce levels of opium poppy cultivation. The Study reports that, as with the Taliban ban and the reductions achieved in Helmand in 2002/03, local powerbrokers have made promises of significant development assistance in order to ensure compliance. It suggests that there is a real danger that the expectations regarding the development assistance that can be delivered and the impact it will have on lives and livelihoods are unrealistically high. It raises concerns that driven by loss of income and increasing levels of accumulated debts there is a strong potential for a resurgence in cultivation in the province in 2005/06.

The Study reports that the reductions in the levels of opium poppy cultivation this year have typically been accompanied by increases in the amount of land dedicated to wheat. It suggests that substituting wheat for opium poppy is not a viable livelihood strategy for the majority of households and that whilst there has been some increase in the cultivation of high value licit crops such as vegetables and fruits, it is unlikely (given the level of cultivation and the maturation period of the crops) that this will be sufficient to meet the shortfall in cash income generated by the significant reductions in opium poppy cultivation that are being reported. The Study further suggests that whilst development interventions are gaining greater outreach, they are currently still rather limited in scope and duration to either impact on household decision making with regard to opium poppy cultivation or address the increasing vulnerability that many households will experience in response to such dramatic reductions in levels of opium poppy cultivation.

In conclusion it could be argued that whilst the political and policy framework for Afghanistan is improving the fundamentals of rural livelihoods have not changed in a major way. In the past under such conditions dramatic reductions in opium poppy cultivation have rarely been sustained. The impact of the Taliban ban on rural livelihoods was as dramatic as it was on the levels of opium poppy cultivation. The elimination of the crop not only led to a significant fall in on-farm income for those that cultivated opium poppy but was accompanied by a loss of employment opportunities for those involved in its harvest. The situation for the majority of farmers was further exacerbated by the dramatic increase in accumulated debt that they experienced when traders converted their unpaid loans, traditionally payable in opium, into cash in 2001 at interest rates of around 1,500%.

Whilst we will never know whether the ban could have been sustained due to the events that followed September 11th, the economic and social unrest that it led to made the demise of the Taliban all the more popular. It is certainly the case that the shift in the ownership of assets with increasing levels of debt amongst the poor and the accumulation of land by the wealthy that resulted from the ban helped drive increasing levels of opium poppy cultivation in the formative years of the current government. A more localised, and recent effort to eliminate opium poppy cultivation in Helmand province proved short lived. Here cultivation fell from an estimated 29,950 hectares in 2001/02 to 15,371 in 2002/03 through a combination of persuasion, coercion and the promise of future development assistance by the local authorities. In the 2003/04 growing season cultivation rebounded to an estimated 29, 352 hectares. It remains to be seen whether this years’ dramatic reductions in Nangarhar and other provinces can be sustained but historical precedent and the current reality of rural livelihoods in Afghanistan do not suggest progress will be as linear as policy makers might like.