Abstract

Opium poppy cultivation in Afghan istan is likely to rise this year. The increase will not be uniform across the country, however, but specific to certain areas. In particular, if predictions are correct, Helman d province in the southern region is likely to see significant expansion in the amount of land allocated to opium poppy, possibly exceeding the previous peak of 45,000 hectares (ha) in 1999. This in- crease is likely to more than compensate for any reduc- tions in cultivation in other provinces.

This rise in the aggregate level of cultivation in Afghani- stan in 2006 may be touted by some as a sign that there is a need to seriously rethink Afghanistan’s current counter- narcotics and development st rategy. Undoubtedly, there will be those who assert that there is a need to adopt a more aggressive position on opium poppy eradication (the physical destruction of crops), possibly pushing for aerial spraying to increase the risk associated with cultivation in the minds of farmers as they approach the 2006—07 plant- ing season. Lost in the media attention, which inevitably focuses on aggregate statistics , will be the shifting dynam- ics of rural livelihood strategies in parts of Afghanistan as well as the complex relationship between location, insecu- rity context, risk and opportunity cost as it applies to opium poppy cultivation.

This briefing paper looks at the relation between eradica- tion of opium poppy and chan ges in the risk associated with its cultivation in Afghanis tan. It draws on five years of fieldwork as well as research conducted in 2006 in four different provinces — Balkh, Ghor, Kunduz and Nangarhar. It argues that simply looking at the risk that destruction of the crop imposes on rural households is insufficient, as a farmer will not associate any real financial costs to the loss of a crop unless there are other legal income opportu- nities available.

Moreover, the risk associated with the insecurity context in which most opium poppy farmers live is a central de- terminant of their behaviour and raises deep questions about the very notion of “legality”. For many farmers the opportunity cost of cultivation remains low, and house- holds will continue to cultivate it, possibly increasing the amount of land dedicated to the crop in places where eradication has led to falling household income and in- creased debt. For other farmers, who are well located with respect to markets and are well endowed with assets of land and water, the opportunity costs of cultivating opium poppy are likely to be much higher. Because con- text matters, one cannot focus just on individual house- hold behaviour in counter-narcotics policy.

Evidence from the field indica tes that the way that eradi- cation has been pursued in many locations is closely linked to the prevailing context of insecurity, rather than sepa- rate from it. It has not succeed ed in increasing the risk of opium poppy cultivation among those farmers who are least reliant on opium poppy as a source of income and as- sociate a high opportunity cost to its cultivation. The inci- dence of bribery and protection for those with political power or access to patron-cli ent relationships reinforce the view that the wealthy ca n cultivate opium poppy with impunity. The belief that it is the poor who are most likely to have their crop destroyed and the perception of ineq- uity is further fuelling discontent and anti-government sentiment.