Abstract

There are numerous reports that opium poppy cultivation in Afghanistan has increased in the 2003/4 growing season. Whilst we will not know how significant this increase is until August/September 2004, we do know that this growth in cultivation, both in terms of area, and in all probability the number of districts cultivating opium, has taken place at a time when opium prices have halved. In some districts, particularly those with a lower baseline in 2003, cultivation will have increased significantly, perhaps by as much as ten fold. However, in other districts increases will have been more marginal. There may well be districts in which the amount of opium poppy has actually fallen.

This diversity in the extent of cultivation amongst districts will be reflected at the household level where cropping decisions are actually made. Attempting to explain this diversity simply in terms of price, and the subsequent profitability of opium, will not further our understanding of the complex resource decisions that households face in their decision both to engage in opium poppy cultivation, and to what degree. Nor will it help explain the policy environment in which these decisions are made and to where households look in calculating some of the risks associated with their involvement in opium production.

This Study explores the different drivers that have influenced opium poppy cultivation in 2003/4, documenting the results of 219 indepth interviews conducted in 14 districts in four provinces of Afghanistan. It builds on fieldwork undertaken during the 2002/3 growing season and draws on the growing body of indepth research that has been undertaken on the role of opium poppy in rural livelihoods in rural Afghanistan.

The Study confirms that despite a significant fall in the farmgate price of opium prior to the planting season, overall the amount of opium poppy planted by those interviewed was expected to increase in 2003/4 compared with the previous growing season. It concludes that there are a number of factors that are driving this increase and that these differ by socio-economic groups and location.

It suggests that the growing confidence over the continued supply of wheat and stable wheat prices has allowed those households with the necessary resources to respond to price signals to dedicate more of their land to opium poppy, rather than cultivate wheat for th eir own consumption. For the resource poor, the Study suggests that the rules governing access to land and credit, as well as the demands of their creditors, ensures that they pursue the livelihood strategy that the resource wealthy dictate. This often means opium poppy cultivation.

In particular, the Study suggests that the increasing tendency to calculate rent on the basis of potential opium production is limiting the cropping choices of those households that lease land in opium poppy producing provinces. It concludes that the inflationary impact that opium cultivation has had on land prices and rents in areas such as Ghor where there are reports of a growing number of Nangarhari and Hemandi farmers leasing land to grow opium poppy, will impede the cultivation of licit crops.

Based on the fieldwork the Study also concludes that accumulated debt and the absence of alternative source of credit continue to drive opium poppy cultivation, particularly in areas where opium poppy production has become concentrated. The Taliban ban of 2001 and eradication in the 2001/2 and 2002/3 growing seasons are cited as the major causes of accumulated debt. It highlights that whilst many households have sold some of their long-term productive assets (including land, labour and daughters) as part paymen t on their accumulated debts, few see any alternatives to repaying their accumulated debts (or regaining their assets) other than through the cultivation of opium poppy. The Study notes that whilst the informal credit system on opium has adjusted to take account of the increase in risk traders have incurred due to eradication, so far it has had no impact on household decision-making.

The Study suggests that the policy initiatives in 2003 that aimed at raising the risks and social costs associated with opium poppy cultivation have not yet taken affect. In particular, that the rather ambiguous position of the local authorities on opium poppy has compromised the unequivocal statements by the central government outlawing the crop. It also indicates that the eradication campaign in the 2002/3 growing season may have contributed to further increases in opium poppy cultivation in 2003/4. Reports from the field suggest that by destroying the crops of the more vulnerable (who were least likely to have alternative sources of livelihood) and subsequently driving up their debts (payable in opium) many households believe they have little choice but to cultivate more opium in subsequent years. It is particularly notable that all those interviewed who were targeted by the eradication campaign in the 2002/3 growing season are cultivating opium poppy in the 2003/4 growing season and that they have, on average, increased the amount of land dedicated to opium by more than those whose crops were left undamaged.

In particular, the Study highlights the perception amongst many farmers that there are currently few alternative sources of livelihood to opium poppy cultivation. From the fieldwork, it is evident that this is not simply in the context of the potential income generated from its cultivation (where currently it is difficult to find alternatives that can compete), but in that opium production is increasingly acting as a medium to access resources critical for meeting basic needs. In rural Afghanistan a resource poor household without land has few non-farm income opportunities, and without credit is unable to invest in either agricultural production or the food they need during times of shortage. By cultivating opium they gain access to both, even though, as the Study illustrates, this is on exploitative terms. As the results of the fieldwork and the cumulative experience of the Taliban ban would suggest, expecting the resource poor to eliminate opium poppy prior to securing an alternative livelihood is unrealistic and can prove counter-productive. As such, the Study highlights that there will be a need for the careful phasing and targeting of drug control interventions, including development assistance and eradication, if there is to be a sustainable elimination of opium poppy cultivation in Afghanistan.